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The expected value that a patent might deliver in the
market is worthy of indepth study. The lack of public data
on patent pricing resulted in theoretical rather than
empirical research on understanding the dynamics ofs published in the Proceed-
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ponsibility of Indian Institutepatent pricing. Nordhaus (1969) and Scherer (1972) studied the
trade-off between benefits and costs of patenting. Thebenefit
of patenting is that it provides impetus to research and
development; the social cost incurred due to patenting is the
deterrence of competition. Heller and Eisenberg (1998) felt
that sometimes patents end up as the ‘tragedy of anti-
commons’. This happens when a stringent patent regime
blocks the free flow of information, thereby inhibiting further
innovation. But the commercialisation of technology permits
the diffusion of technological know-how and nullifies the
inefficiencies generated by the patent system (Serrano, 2008).
Hall and Zeidonis (2001) found evidence on how the
technology markets helped the rise of ‘fabless’ semi-
conductor design firms. In other words, a well developed
market for technology is an important source of innovation
for every national economy (Serrano, 2008). Gambardella
(2007) argues that the market for patents has the poten-
tial to turn into a highly profitable economic activity.
Various researchers use the terms technology and patents
interchangeably. In this paper as well, market for tech-
nology and market for patents are used synonymously.
Commercialisation of patents has become a revenue
generation tool for most corporate entities. Patents serve
as a bargaining chip for business negotiations, licensing and
Effect of firm variables on patent price 41cross-licensing (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Reitzig, 2003;
Silverthorne, 2008). Small firms license their patents due
to the absence of proper production and marketing facili-
ties while large firms tend to engage in cross-licensing
(Motohashi, 2008). There is a distinction between transfer
and licensing (Serrano, 2008). Transfer refers to a change in
ownership, while licensing refers to the permission for the
use of technology with the guarantee of not being sued by
the owner. Transfer of patent rights is one of the other
important methods of commercialising a patent (Serrano,
2005, 2008). However, as opined by Lee and Lee (2010),
all these methods of patent commercialisation are ineffi-
cient, since the information asymmetry in these practices
results in an ‘unfair and costly transaction of technology’.
An improved mechanism for technology transfer would be
a robust market place for patent assets where a transaction
deal works out for both the buyers and the sellers (Kremer,
1997; Viscounty, De Vries, & Kennedy, 2006). Such an ideal
market for patents would be a patent auctions market.
Auctioning has the ‘potential to eliminate monopoly price
distortions and incentives for rentestealing duplicative
research created by patents, while increasing incentives for
original research’ (Kremer, 1997).
In a recent paper by Sreekumaran Nair, Mathew, and Nag
(2011) it was found that forward citation and foreign filings
correlated positively with patent price. To further the body
of knowledge, in this study, we analyse whether the auction
price of patents varies with two exogenous variables
namely, size, (small versus large entities) and assignee
type, where we try to study the difference between the
prices received by individual inventor owned patents versus
organisational inventor owned patents. We have used
Ocean Tomo real auction price data to perform our
analyses.
This paper is divided into six sections. In the next section,
patent auction markets are explained in detail. The third
section explains the various proxies for patent value. In
sections four and five, we report our data and analyses
respectively. In the final section, we conclude the paper.Auctions for patents
Stigler and Sherwin (1985) define market as ‘. the area
within which price is determined: the market is that set of
suppliers and demanders whose trading establishes the
price of a good’. Auctions are one of the oldest forms of
markets (Varian, 2010, p 314). The bidding structure fol-
lowed by Ocean Tomo is the English auction (also referred
to as open ascending bid auctions). In an English auction,
the auctioneer starts with a reserve price, the lowest price
at which the seller would be willing to engage in a trans-
action. Bidders offer higher prices. The commodity is
transacted at the highest offer, when no one is willing to
further improve the bid (Varian, 2010; pp 311). A well
designed auction would discourage collusive, entry deter-
ring and predatory behaviour (Klemperer, 2002).
Lee (2009) state three advantages of a patent auction
market. Firstly, it provides a platform for the patent
holders to exchange ideas. Secondly, it helps the frag-
mented patents to be ‘consolidate(d) in a traditional
patent system’. Packaging and pooling patents together(Shapiro, 2001) and auctioning them as a single entity,
results in consolidation. Thirdly, auction markets benefit
both buyers and sellers. It fetches sellers with ‘true market
sale’ and also provides visibility to their patents even if
they do not get transacted in the market place (Ocean
Tomo, accessed in June 2009). The advantages for the
buyers are ‘informed access’ and ‘equal opportunity’ to
purchase patents (Ocean Tomo, accessed in June 2009;
Viscounty et al., 2006). Patent auctions provide a new
avenue for patent monetisation. Patent auctions ‘facilitate
innovation by providing the mechanism to realise the
intrinsic value’ of sleeping patents (Viscounty et al., 2006).
Kremer (1997) stated that if the seller has private
information about the value of a patent, then the buyers
would come up with low bids out of the fear of a winner’s
curse. Therefore, the seller would be willing to disclose
information about the patent so that there will be no
adverse selection in the bidding.
Ocean Tomo, LLC, Chicago has been involved in patent
auctions since 2006. As IP (intellectual property) brokers,
they bridge the supply and demand of intellectual capital
and are ‘active market makers’ (Benassi & Di Minn, 2007).
Patent brokers act as intermediaries between buyers and
sellers. They help remove information asymmetry in the
market (Benassi & Di Minn, 2007). This is important in
a technology market, as the commodity to be sold is
different from any other commodity. The commodities
transacted here (patents) are to be used as inputs and have
a shelf life. Without patent brokers, sealing the transaction
would be difficult and time consuming for both the buyer
and the seller.
Proxies for patent value
In this section, we define the variables used in our study
along with describing them as found in prior art.
Price
There have been a limited number of studies on patent
valuation using the price of the patent as a proxy for value.
Harhoff, Scherer, and Vopel (2003) were probably the first
scholars to consider the value of a patent as its asset value.
They studied patent valuation using the price at which the
patent holder was willing to sell his right over the patent.
Harhoff et al. (2003) used 11,471 patents granted initially
by the German Patent Office in 1977 as their sample. The
sample came from a population of 24,116 patents which
were granted, out of 57,782 patent applications. It should
be noted that one of the studies on patent valuation with
price being assumed as the proxy was published only as late
as 2003. This shows that research on valuation using the
patent price is in an infant stage.
Gambardella, Harhoff, and Verspagen (2008) used the
PatVal-EU survey data for their study. They estimated the
economic value of a patent by using the data drawn from
a large scale survey of European patents. Data was
collected for more than 9000 patents (out of 27,000 ques-
tionnaire mailings). These were patents granted by the EPO
with a priority date between 1993 and 1997. The survey was
carried out by asking the inventor, mentioned in the patent
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which this patent is granted, the applicant had all the
information about the value of the patent that is available
today. In case the potential competitor of the applicant
was interested in buying a patent, what would be the
minimum price (in euro) the applicant should
demand?’(Gambardella et al., 2008; pp. 70).
Giuri et al. (2007, pp. 1107) explain how the PatVal-EU
survey was conducted. The paper provides information
about ‘. the characteristics of European inventors, the
sources of their knowledge, the importance of formal and
informal collaborations, the motivations to invent, and the
actual use and economic value of the patents’.
In the above mentioned studies, patents were valued
higher than the value predicted using other approaches like
the renewal approach (Pakes, 1986; Schankerman & Pakes,
1986) and the re-assignment approach (Serrano, 2005;
2008). This is because the seller is also foregoing poten-
tial returns possible from the patent. When patents are sold
to a third party, the third party can prevent the initial
owner from using the patent any further. And if the patent
happens to be a broad one, the sellers could be at a future
risk when they attempt further inventions in that particular
field. These would force the seller to appreciate the price
of the patent and the transacted price will carry a premium
of the potential returns foregone (Gambardella et al.,
2008).
Forward citations
Forward citations are defined in our study as the number of
patent citations that an auctioned patent received till the
Ocean Tomo date of sale. Bessen (2008) studied that self
citations improved patent value by 3%. There is extensive
literature supporting the positive correlation between
forward citations and patent price (Gambardella et al.,
2008; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, & Vopel, 1999, 2003;
Reitzig, 2004; Sreekumaran Nair et al., 2011; Trajtenberg,
1990). Hall, Jaffe, and Tratjenberg (2005) found that
every extra citation improved patent value by 3%.
Foreign filings
Foreign filings refer to whether a patent auctioned has
multi-country filings. Harhoff et al. (2003), Guellec and van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2000) and Sreekumaran Nair
et al. (2011) found that patent value is higher if a patent
has multi-country filings. Bessen and Meurer (2008) also
found supporting evidence that international filings
improve the value of a patent.
Entity size of patent owner
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
designates every patent as belonging to either a small
entity or a large entity. Individual inventors, small business
concerns (with less than 500 employees) and non profit
organisations are small entities. For the small entities, the
renewal fees are almost halved by the USPTO.
Bessen (2008) found that patents belonging to small
firms realise less value than patents belonging to largefirms. According to him, this is so because small firms
maximise the utility from their patents through alternative
means like ‘lead-time advantage’ or ‘because they occupy
profitable niches’. Mogee (2003) indicated that patents of
small firms have more ‘public value’ (more forward cita-
tions) than patents owned by large firms. She also added
that small firms do not patent in foreign countries to the
extent that they could, thus missing commercial advan-
tages. Serrano (2008) found that small innovators are active
sellers of patents than large inventors.
Assignee type
The ownership (assignee) details of the patent can be
identified from the website of the USPTO (Serrano, 2005;
2008; Bessen, 2008). According to Serrano (2005; 2008)
and Bessen (2008), patents are assigned to individual
inventors if they are not assigned at issue. The patent can
be assigned either to inventor(s) or to an organisation. If
there is no mention of the assignee in the front page of the
patent document, then the inventor is the assignee. Bessen
(2008) found that patents belonging to individual inventors
have a lower value than the ones owned by organisations.
Bessen’s study mainly had US assignees.
Data
Ocean Tomo, LLC, a leading intellectual capital merchant
bank, describes itself as providing ‘financial products and
services related to intellectual property, including expert
testimony, valuation, research, ratings, investments, risk
management and transactions’ (Ocean Tomo, accessed on
May 2011). The company has been dealing with patent
auctions since 2006. Ocean Tomo’s is not the only auction
format (Landers, 2006). Landers (2006) explains various
formats of auctioning: ‘bankruptcy proceedings designed to
raise funds to pay off creditors, do-it-yourself auctions on
eBay.com and a free patent auction website (freepatents.
com)’. But none of them have been more successful than
Ocean Tomo.
Between 2006 and 2009, Ocean Tomo generated $114.6
million in revenue. In June 2009, Intercapital (ICAP)
acquired the transactions division of Ocean Tomo and
started a new company ICAP Ocean Tomo. Some firms like
Hewlett Packard sell their portfolio of patents themselves.
But it is difficult to judge which one is a better avenue for
technology transfer e approaching a firm directly or
approaching a patent broker for alternative technologies.
Between 2006 and 2008, Ocean Tomo listed 635 patent
lots for sale. Out of the 635, 268 patent lots were
successfully auctioned. The patent lots consisted of
singleton patent lots and multiple patent lots (portfolios).
Singleton patent lots have only one United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted patent in that lot.
Multiple patent lots have more than one USPTO granted
patent. In this paper, we consider only singleton patent
lots. We believe that multiple patent lots deserve to be
studied separately. Since multiple patent lots have more
than one patent in the lot, taking the average of the price
of patents in a multiple patents lot would either overvalue
a patent or undervalue it. Arriving at average price requires
Figure 1 Histogram showing distribution of patent price.
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them in our study.
Out of the 635 patent lots listed for auction, 349 lots
were that of singleton patents. From the 349 lots, 167
singleton lots were successfully auctioned by Ocean Tomo.
The following types of lots were considered as singleton
patent: First, lots which had a single USPTO granted patent.
Second, lots which had a single USPTO granted patent and
its foreign rights. Third, lots which had a single USPTO
granted patent along with pending patent applications.
Fourth, lots which had a single USPTO granted patent, its
foreign rights and some pending patent applications. We
ignored the pending patent applications as it was difficult
to get information about them. The entity status of the
patent owner and assignee details of the patent was ob-
tained from the website of USPTO. Singleton patent lots
form the sample for our study.
Analyses and discussion
All the statistical analyses in our paper were carried out
using the statistical package ‘R’ (R Development core team,
2005). The price of the patents varied from a minimum of
USD 2200 to a maximum of USD 4,895,550. The mean price
(USD 282,214) is much higher than the median price (USD
132,000). The histogram shown in Fig. 1, describes the
distribution of patent price. From Fig. 1, we observe that
the price data is skewed and has a long right tail. The
skewness of the price means that most of the patents soldTable 1 ManneWhitney for testing whether patents auctioned
Lots without foreign rights (N Z 99)
Mean Median
Price 243,206 110,000
Signif. Codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05.are of less value while a few of them are highly valuable
(Bessen & Meurer, 2008, p 101). To quote Bessen and
Meurer (2008, p. 101), ‘. no single number can represent
the value of patents for all the possible inquiries we might
want to make about patent value’. The mean price being
higher than median price is the result of skewness in price
data.
Classifying patent prices based on foreign filings
We classified the successfully auctioned patent lots into
two e lots which had USPTO patent and no foreign filings
and lots which had USPTO patent along with its foreign
rights. The lots with USPTO patent along with foreign filings
turned out to be 68 in number and lots which had USPTO
patent and no foreign rights turned out to be 99 in number.
We used the two sample ManneWhitney test (Table 1) to
analyse whether there is any statistically significant
difference between the price attracted by the two groups.
The ManneWhitney test showed that both the groups follow
different distribution. Lots where a patent is sold along
with its foreign rights attract a higher price than the lots
with a patent and no foreign rights. Our results are
consistent with the work done by Harhoff et al. (2003) and
Sreekumaran Nair et al. (2011).
Classifying patent prices on the basis of entity size
We categorised the patents as, either belonging to a large
firm or a small firm in order to understand whether patents
belonging to large firms have more value than that of small
firms (Bessen, 2008). This classification was based on the
entity size of the patent owner as on the Ocean Tomo date of
sale. One hundred and six patents belonging to small firms
were successfully auctioned. The remaining 61 patents that
got auctioned belonged to large firms. The descriptive
statistics and results of the two sample ManneWhitney tests
are shown in Table 2.
Using the ManneWhitney test, we analysed whether
patents belonging to larger firms were valued more. We
found that the price of the patents belonging to both the
groups were not statistically different. Patents belonging to
smaller firms have more forward citations than the patents
belonging to large firms. This is consistent with the
commentary by Mogee (2003). Patents owned by smaller
firms, ‘represent a higher percentage of both the top one
percent and top 10% of the patents most often cited in
other patent applications’ and thereby enjoy a higher
public value (Mogee, 2003).
We further divided the patent lots belonging to small
and large firms into two, depending on whether the lots
included foreign filings or not (Table 3). We found that thewith their foreign rights carry a higher price.
Lots with foreign rights (N Z 68) P value
Mean Median
354,587 206,250 0.00***
Table 2 ManneWhitney tests for large and small entities.
Variable Large firm (N Z 61) Small firm (N Z 106) P value
Mean Median Mean Median
Price 205,947 110,000 336,100 164,407 0.106
Forward citations 13.44 5 37.12 13 0.005***
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05.
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followed the same distribution when the lots sold did not
include any foreign filings. But the patents from small firms
carried higher prices when the lots were sold along with
their foreign rights. Small firm patents had a higher average
and median (USD 473,062 and USD 233,750 respectively)
than large firm patents (USD 221,302 and USD 124,792
respectively) when the lots included foreign rights.
Classifying patent prices based on ownership of
patents
We investigated the effect of ownership on price. We
classified the patents based on whether they were inventor
owned or organisation owned. There were 83 inventor
owned patents and 84 organisation owned patents. The
results of the two sample ManneWhitney test based on
ownership are presented in Table 4.
Bessen (2008) found that the patents owned by indi-
vidual assignees ‘have the lowest patent value’ while
‘patent values from organisational inventors (mostly firms)
are larger’. But in our study, we found that the price of the
patents belonging to the two groups were not statistically
different. In other words, we could not establish that the
patents owned by inventors are less valuable than the
patents owned by organisations.
We further divided the price of patent lots classified on
the basis of inventor owned and organisation owned into
two, depending on whether the lots included foreign
filings or not (Table 5). The prices of both categories
(inventor owned patents and organisation owned patents)
followed different distributions when the lot did not




Price (without foreign filings) 29 189,002 88
Price (with foreign filings) 32 221,302 124
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05.
Table 4 Descriptive statistics and ManneWhitney tests for inve
Variable Inventor owned (N Z 83)
Mean Median
Price 306,439 132,000
Forward citations 31.23 12.5a higher mean and median price (USD 306,761 and USD
126,500 respectively) than organisation owned patents
(USD 144,544 and USD 107,250 respectively) when the lots
did not include foreign rights. The price of both categories
followed the same distribution, when the lots had foreign
filings.
Exogenous variables and patent price
Using Ordinary Least Squares, we tried to verify whether
there exists any statistically significant relationship
between the price of a patent and the exogenous variables
considered in the study. Since, the price data was skewed
to the right and non normal, we transformed it to its log
value before performing the analysis. The transformed
price data was an approximation of the lognormal distri-
bution. The exogenous variables were introduced into the
model as dummy variables. Patents belonging to small firms
were labelled ‘one’, and others as ‘zero’. Patents owned by
organisations were labelled ‘one’, and others as ‘zero’. We
took the logarithmic value of patent price as the outcome
variable and the exogenous variables as the predictor
variables. The results of the regression analyses are pre-
sented in Table 6.
In Model 1, presented in Table 6, we regressed the price
of the entire sample (N observations Z 167) on the exog-
enous variables. The model was non significant. Both entity
size and ownership did not have a statistically significant
relationship with price. Since foreign filings have an influ-
ence on the price of the patent, we divided the patent lots
into lots with foreign filings and lots without foreign filings.
In Model 2 of Table 6, we regressed log-price of patents
with no foreign filings on the exogenous variables. The Fgorising them into lots with foreign filings and lots without
Small firm P value
dian N Mean Median
,000 70 265,662 110,000 0.261
,792 36 473,062 233,750 0.007***
ntor owned and organisation owned patents.




Table 5 ManneWhitney tests for inventor owned patents and organisation owned patents further categorising them into lots
with foreign filings and lots without foreign filings.
Variable Inventor owned Assignee owned P value
N Mean Median N Mean Median
Price (without foreign filings) 60 306,761 126,500 39 145,430 104,500 0.024*
Price (with foreign filings) 23 305,598 220,000 45 379,625 198,000 0.57
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05.
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owned patents attracted a higher price than organisation
owned patents when multi-country filings were not
included.
In Model 3 of Table 6, we regressed the log-price of
patents with foreign filings on the exogenous variables. The
model was significant (F Z 3.9, p Z 0.02). We found that
the patents belonging to small firms attracted a higher
price than patents belonging to large firms when multi-
country filings were included.
We used Heckman’s two-stage sample selection model
(or Heckit model) in Models 4 and 5 as seen in Table 6 to
check for sample bias. In Model 4, we considered those
patents which did not have foreign filings. For the first
stage, i.e., the selection model stage, we used entity size
and ownership as the covariates to run the Probit. In the
second stage, i.e., the regression model stage, we
regressed the log of price on ownership and Inverse Mills
ratio. A non significant Inverse Mills ratio revealed that the
selection bias was absent. But we found that the ownership
did not correlate positively with the log of price.
In Model 5, we considered patents which had foreign
filings. In the selection model, we used entity size and
ownership as the covariates to run the Probit. In the
regression model, we regressed the log of price on entity
size and Inverse Mills ratio. A non significant Inverse Mills
ratio revealed that the selection bias is absent. But we
found that the entity size did not correlate positively with
the log of price.
We do not have much evidence to conclude on the causal
relationship between exogenous variables (entity size and
ownership) and the price of the patent. But we noticed that
the correlation between the exogenous variables and the






Intercept 5.066*** (0.097) 5.108*** (0.133)
Entity size 0.097 (0.095) 0.002 (0.135)
Ownership 0.002 (0.091) 0.278* (0.127)
Multiple R2 0.007 0.053
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.033
Standard error 0.5608 0.5852
Inverse mills ratio e e
F statistic 0.603 2.661
N observations 167 99
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. The standard errors areModel 3 (lots with foreign filings). Patents of small firms
attract a higher price than patents of larger firms when
both sets of patents have multi-country filings. Mogee
(2003) argued that the low ‘private’ value of patents
owned by small firms was due to the lack of their foreign
filing behaviour. We observed that as small firms improve
their foreign filing behaviour, the private value of their
patent also increases.
We found that inventor owned patents attract a higher
price than organisation owned patents when both sets
of patents do not have multi-country filings. From our data,
we noticed that organisations engage in multi-country
filings more than individual inventors. Forty five lots
out of a total of 85 organisation owned patents had foreign
filings, as against 23 out of a total of 83 for inventor owned
patents. It is the lack of resources and awareness that may
be preventing individual inventors to engage in multi-
country filings and maximise the revenue from their
patents. Multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity were
tested for all models using Variance Inflation Factor test
and Breusch Pagan test respectively.
The F statistic in both Models one and two turned out to
be statistically non significant. We are therefore cautious in
concluding whether patents of individual inventors attract
a higher price than patents belonging to organisations when
the patents do not have foreign filings. Arora, Fosfuri, and
Gambardella (2001), highlight the fact that organisations
like Boeing, IBM, Du Pont, Procter and Gamble, Union
Carbide and Philips put up their patents for licensing in
their web portals. Some of these companies have also used
Ocean Tomo to sell their patents. A larger data size is
required to generalise whether organisation owned patents
indeed attract a lower price, with or without foreign filings.










5.035*** (0.119) 5.170*** (0.971) 6.054*** (1.048)
0.279* (0.108) e 0.576 (0.479)




e 0.090 (1.372) 1.364 (1.636)
3.865* e e
68 349 349
shown in the parentheses.
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market. The same problem persists when we analyse the
relationship between patent price and entity size.
The Heckman model used in Models 4 and 5 does not
replicate the results obtained in Models 2 and 3, even
though we found sampling bias to be absent. The lack of
covariance between selection and regression may also be
due to the small sample size and hence is not to be
generalised. Replicating this study with a larger represen-
tative sample may help confirm the results obtained in this
study. Nevertheless, this study takes the knowledge body of
patent pricing a step further.Conclusion
Knowing the value that a patent would deliver in the
market is important, but it involves a high degree of
uncertainty. Therefore, the decision to patent or not is
a difficult one to make for top managements of any orga-
nisation, conscious of its financial resources. A detailed
study of patent price dynamics is crucial for solving the
mystery of patent value. Researchers find it difficult to
work on patent value as there is very little publicly avail-
able data on patent price for making a breakthrough.
Researchers have started focussing on patent auction
pricing as a suitable way of determining patent value.
In this paper, we have used real auction price data ob-
tained from Ocean Tomo, LLC. The following objectives are
attempted e (i) whether patents owned by larger firms
attract a higher price and (ii) whether organisation owned
patents attract a higher price.
We found that the patents sold along with their foreign
rights fetched a higher price than patents which had no
multi-country filings. From our data, we observe that
patents owned by small entities get a higher price than the
patents owned by large entities, if they engage in multi-
country filing. We also observe that patents of smaller firms
get cited more. We find that price attracted by patents
owned by individual inventors are statistically not different
from the price attracted by patents owned by organisa-
tions. But inventor owned patents attract a higher price
when multi-country filings are not considered. We believe
that the individual inventors may be lacking the resources
to file in multiple countries and maximise the returns for
their invention. Since, the data used for analysis may suffer
from sampling bias, replicating these results using large
representative data is ideal before generalising the results.
All the above results require more rigorous study using
larger data sets, to be accepted with complete certainty.
This important shortcoming needs to be addressed in the
future by having a larger sample size. The price data of
patents is difficult to obtain and this is a challenge for
researchers. This paper describes an exploratory empir-
ical study to improve our understanding on patent price.
Although many authors have attempted to theoretically
describe the phenomena of patent pricing, empirical
evidence was scarce. Apart from the variable forward
citations, there are only a few studies which validate the
relationship between patent latent variables and patent
value. We believe that, after addressing the limitations
mentioned above, at least partially, framing a theoreticalmodel or hypotheses could be considered. Hence, we
have refrained from building a theoretical model for the
paper.
An event study of stock prices of assignees around the
time the patents were granted and re-assigned would have
been interesting. Around twoethirds of our sample consists
of patents belonging to small entities. Most of these entities
are not publicly listed and hence, doing an event study for
this sample was not feasible. An event study can be
attempted after collecting more data on the price attrac-
ted by the patents belonging to larger firms.
Studying the impact of re-assignments on the price
would have captured how small firms license/sell their
patents. Unfortunately, a vast majority of the patents are
still live at this time of the study and capturing their effect
on the price is difficult and may not be exact. Hence, we
leave that for future studies. The effect of the role played
by the examiner in determining the price of a patent could
also be attempted in the future to enhance the under-
standing of price dynamics.
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